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Discussion After the Speeches of Robert C. Cassidy
and Simon V. Potter
QUESTION, Professor King: We hear cries that Japan has not
opened up her markets; that there are certain markets that are very
difficult, very traditionally Japanese; that they do not practice free
trade. Should we play a little hardball with Japan? Is the trade surplus,
which is on a continuing basis, something we can live with indefinitely?
ANSWER, Mr. Cassidy: Before I start, let me declare where I
am coming from. I represent Ford, GM and Chrysler as a group who
do not like minivans or automobiles from Japan; I represent Sumitomo
Metals who exports steel to the United States; I represent DuPont, who
does not like many chemicals from Japan; and I represent OKI Electric, who sells semi-conductors and telephones and a lot of other things
in the United States. So, I am squarely caught in the middle on this
one.
Ignoring all of those client concerns, I have been much involved
with Japan now going on almost twenty years because I spent the vast
majority of my time in government dealing with Japan issues, a great
deal of that time in Japan, and since then, working on both sides of the
Japan trade problem.
It is an extremely interesting question and an extremely difficult
one for policy makers. Let me tell you very briefly where I think the
new administration is going. Then, if I have a moment, I will give you
my own views on this. There was an attempt by the Clinton Administration to develop a new Japan policy in time for the meeting of the
Prime Minister with the President. That did not succeed for a number
of reasons, the most significant of which is that they could not reach
any agreement amongst themselves on what the policy towards Japan
ought to be. Much to their amazement, but no one else's.
There is a strong argument being made, which is new at least in
government at that level, that the traditional approach to U.S.-Japan
economic issues in the economic area which has been, to use the term
the critics use, a process-oriented approach, does not work. The process
approach seeks to manage the disputes and tries to find a resolution to
problems as they arise. This approach goes back at least to what was
called the Straus-Ushiba Agreement of about 1978. The notion was
that disagreements are inevitable. Yes, the Japanese market is closed in
many respects, but these are not irrational people and if we have a way
in which we can keep talking at them, keep hammering away at them,
we can solve these problems one by one. Perhaps over time the problem •
will alleviate itself. The problem being defined in political terms as the
structural bilateral trade deficit.
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Now, let me stop there a second. That number is an abstraction. It
does not mean anything except that politicians get very excited when
they see it. It magnifies the concern that they hear from numerous constituents who say they do not like the fact that the Japanese are buying
this factory or they do not like the fact that they lost their job because
of competition with the Japanese. So it all becomes focused on the statistical manifestation of this competition which is the trade deficit.
The trouble with the approach, if there is any trouble with the
traditional approach, is that the bilateral trade deficit has not changed.
It is still there. If anything, it is getting bigger, due, not surprisingly, to
a combination of the recession in Japan, the recovery in the United
States, and the consequent changes in the exchange rate.
A substantial faction in the Clinton Administration is saying,
"Okay, we've tried this approach and it clearly has not worked. We
have got to do something else. We have got to stop the business of
going in and trying to make the Japanese more like us. We should tell
them, in its crudest terms, that we want ten percent of their automobile
market. You figure out how to make it happen. And you've got five
years to do it. And if you can't do it, well, that's all right. No problem,
you just can't sell cars here." That is a proposal which I did not make
up. That is a proposal I have heard discussed seriously by a very senior
U.S. government official in the new administration.
So, I do not know where this is going to come out. Impasse is
certainly a result that is not excluded knowing the depth of the feelings
on this issue. However, my guess is that we will have at least some
change, certainly a change in tone. We have already had a change in
tone in the discussion of Japan, and that was started by the President
himself. But it is likely that we will probably find ourselves trying
something perhaps a bit less draconian than what I described to you.
We will find ourselves trying some variation on the theme of identifying
some sectors in Japan where we have a reason to believe that we can
succeed because we are competitive and, in essence, asking the Japanese to do whatever they have to do to produce a result.
My guess is also that this approach, if it is adopted, will be accompanied by a continuation of the traditional approach to Japan, which is
increasingly, I believe, focused on a fundamental part of the Japanese
system: their capital markets. Japanese companies do not have to pay
the cost of money that the rest of the world has to pay and it is not
entirely attributable to the fact that they have an enormous pool of
savings, which is absolutely true. However, it is at least partially due to
the fact that there is not any liberal trade in money, if you will, that
allows interest rates and stock prices to reach anything near what one
would expect to be the market rates for those things. And I believe
certainly a Treasury Department working under Mr. Bentsen is likely
to focus on that issue increasingly and, in my view, correctly.
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Having said that, I think the easy solution to the Japanese problem is for them to reduce their exports of automobiles to something like
eighty percent of where they are. If that number was achieved, my
clients would be very happy. If you exclude automobiles from U.S.Japan bilateral trade pattern, and you look over the last thirty years,
you have a very normal trading pattern. There are surpluses and there
are deficits going both ways. It is a perfectly healthy trading relationship. Therefore, clearly, we have to fix the car problem.
QUESTION, Mr. Russell: Can I rise to the bait offered by the
two speakers and ask a question of each?
The first question is directed at Robert Cassidy's theory that Section 301 had essentially been successful in citing the semiconductor
agreement. As an example of that, I am not sure that the Japanese,
somehow inching by the quota in the last month under which the
agreement was constructed, qualifies a success of the semiconductor
agreement. Whether or not that is the case, does not that sort of managed trade, aggressive unilateralism, have exactly the same sort of
problems that Michael Hart identified with industrial policy? That is,
you must, in fact, pick winning and losing sectors, decide somewhat
arbitrarily what proportion of the market you want, and thereby distort
what is, in effect, free trade and what would normally be construed as
normal economic efficiency. I would be curious to hear your response to
that point of view.
To Simon Potter, briefly, my question is: You raised the issue of
the U.S. trading partners being incensed by their position on subsidiaries. It raises the question, I would think logically, of why has somebody
not done something about it; i.e. what in your view is the reason that
we have not seen a plethora of countervailing duty actions under the
Special Import Measures Act or equivalent statutes in other
jurisdictions?
ANSWER, Mr. Potter: There are two answers to the question:
"Why have there not been more CVD cases against the United
States?" One easy answer, which is given a little too glibly sometimes,
but there is a kernel of truth to it regarding Canada anyway, is that
Canadians are simply less litigious and they do not like getting into a
fight on these things. They like simply to go to work and do their job
and get through the day and go home. There is an element to that.
They do not see life as running to the next court battle.
Another element which I think does explain it, besides the fact
that many of the people who might complain about it in Canada are
actually corporately related to the people against whom they would
complain, is that it is the "Defense Department thing." Taking that as
an example, you would have a very difficult time showing the "specificness" of the subsidization under the GATT. Showing that the money
which came from the government through the Defense Department,
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down through its twenty percent ownership of RCA, actually gave to a
particular American company a benefit of X. Now, the fact that it is
hard to quantify and hard to prove does not mean that it is not there
and does not mean that it is not a source of irritation. But it does mean
it is more difficult to do something about it. I think that is the main
answer.
ANSWER, Mr. Cassidy: I have a little trouble with this image of
these hard-working Canadian peasants and fitting that in with my dealings with these rapacious Toronto financiers that I usually see. To answer your question about 301, it is worth repeating that I was party to
the negotiation on semiconductors for a Japanese company that led to
that result so I do not particularly consider it to be a victory. There are
those who consider and, indeed, use the example of the semiconductor
war as an example of industrial policy itself. It is purely trade related.
There is nothing else. That is exactly the kind of thing that I was saying I do not consider to be industrial policy because it was nothing but
border measures; that is to say a floor price system for imports, which
enriched not only domestic U.S. producers, but even more so, Japanese
producers enormously, at the expense of the consumers. That is not you
and me, by the way. The consumers are people like IBM and DEC and
Compact and Apple who, as a consequence of that, created an entirely
new trade association to combat against this ever happening again. But
so much for the digression.
Was it a success or not? From the perspective of the people who
wanted it, who were the U.S. producers of semiconductors, it was a
dramatic success. They received higher prices for their product in their
biggest market, which is the United States, and they, as I recall,
doubled their market share in the second biggest market for semiconductors in the world, Japan. The fact that the number of twenty percent was just barely met is neither here nor there. The Japanese have
never agreed that they agreed to a twenty percent number so that is a
debating point. From the perspective of the people who initiated the
measures it was a dramatic success.
From an objective point of view I would have to ask you where you
are sitting If you are a producer of computers it was a disaster. One
thing that happened is they moved offshore more production so they
could get access to less expensive chips that were not subject to the
floor price system.
For a consumer, it was a bit of a blip because the price of the chip
is such a small overall cost of the machine to us that we did not really
see it. As a government policy official, well, that is another seminar.
QUESTION, Mr. Browne: I have a question for Mr. Cassidy. In
your second intervention you ended by saying we have to solve the automobile problem. I think that is a good illustration of what it is we are
looking at here if we are considering industrial policies of governments.
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How do we come to grips with the sorts of issues that are raised in
the automobile problem? For example, at the largest U.S. auto show,
the automobile that was awarded the recognition of the best American
car of the year, in fact, came from Canada; the Toyota is now advertised as the best car built in America. There is the example of some
U.S. administration that was buying road graders or road-making machinery so they chose an American brand over the Japanese only to
find out later that, in fact, the Japanese brand had more American
content than the American brand. We keep running into these things.
Also, you referred to the fact that you would like to see more restraints on the sales of minivans from Japan into the United States.
Our experience in Canada when we had the VRAs on the exports of
automobiles from Japan, after the fact, of course, was that the net effect was to simply transfer economic grants from Canadian consumers
to Japanese producers. It seems to me that these sorts of themes or
examples suggest that any traditional approach to the industrial or
trade policy that says we have an American product or Canadian product or Japanese product and somehow governments have to intervene to
isolate a balance is not going to take us very far. How do you come to
grips with these sorts of issues?
ANSWER, Mr. Cassidy: I was being slightly flip in talking about
automobiles given the-fact they are my clients. However, let us pursue
this for a moment. First of all, you must keep in mind the automobile
industry is quite difficult for U.S. and Canadian Government officials
to deal with because the industry perceives itself to be North American
in a rather profound way which is not too hard to understand when you
go south from Detroit over into Windsor and see all those factories
sitting there. It is, as you know, the oldest example of U.S.-Canadian
free trade under the auto pact.
The border here truly does not exist, insofar as I can make out, in
the minds of the people who are making the decisions for the industry.
They perceive that they have a problem of competition with Japan in
North America, and the fact that it may be in Canada or the U.S. does
not seem to register particularly. But because we work in a national
system that requires you to use the laws of one country or the other,
they have used the dumping laws in Canada and the United States.
You still have to deal with the relics of the national system in the automobile sector.
It does appear to me that the industry is tending increasingly to
focus its analysis of its competitive problem with the Japanese, first and
foremost on its internal problem: its own industrial problem. How do
we make ourselves more efficient? If you look at Chrysler and, even
more so, at Ford, they have made remarkable steps in becoming more
efficient and a great deal more productive in reducing the faults of the
vehicle so that for many vehicles today, if you take a look at the
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"things gone wrong" surveys, you will find that the American product
is at least as good as if not better than the Japanese product. I say
American. I mean North America because a lot of these are made in
Canada. So that is step one.
Unfortunately, the great big gorilla in this, General Motors, has
been rather slow in adapting itself. It has some remarkable success stories to tell, Saturn being the most obvious. But the company overall is
at the late stages of the beginning of its reorganization in order to survive, and it is going to be extremely painful. So that is step one, just
where they focus.
Step two is that they have established alliances with the Japanese.
The purpose of those alliances is to get access to Japanese technology.
That has worked reasonably well. At this point there are some new
proposals on the table where the Japanese want access to their technology so the question becomes, well, what do we do? Do we give them
stuff that they need in exchange or not? It is an interesting strategic
question to which they have not yet reached an answer.
Then you have the day-to-day trade problem, so called. First impulse, I think, still is to look at this as an export issue. They would love
to get into the Japanese market in a bigger way. They are spending a
great deal of money on it and the days when they used to say, "Well,
we don't want to make left-hand drive cars" are long behind them.
However, it is extremely difficult to get into that market for a variety
of reasons all of which are the usual stories one hears about Japan. It
will take a long time. Any government assistance they can get from the
United States in that regard would be appreciated. Their view strategically is if they can establish themselves effectively in Japan, then a lot
of this problem may eliminate itself. But in the meantime, they still
have a principal market here in North America, and in order to fund
the enormous costs they are incurring to build new facilities and to pay
for workers that they have laid off but still have to pay under their
union contracts, they see absolutely no harm in talking to the government about the possibility of getting the government doing something
to have the Japanese back off a bit. I hasten to say the government has
not agreed to do this. The so-called VRAs that the Japanese media
announces every March are an illusion. The Japanese government asks
car makers how many are they going to ship to the U.S. each year and
then add a couple hundred to that. Then they declare that to be their
VRA. It is polite. It is reassuring. Exports are not going to shoot up,
which is true, so there is some effect to it. But insofar as having a
depressing effect on the trade, it is nonsense. There is no simple
solution.

